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I would like to discuss in this paper some of my feelings about the state of research in organizational psychology, especially as it pertains to that difficult concept--organizational culture.
I will begin with two stories. At a recent symposium on telecommunications I was sitting next to the President of one of the major providers of such services. A professor was analyzing the market penetration of different companies in different parts of the world and made several references to my neighbor's company.
He was getting increasingly agitated and finally said to me:
"Its wonderful what these professors can make up in the way of a story on company data that happen to be completely wrong."
The second story was told to me by a colleague who had been part of a research team to study how a large British corporation had managed some of its major changes over the last decade. The research program called for "accurate data"
hence all interviews with members of the company were to be tape recorded. My colleague reported a particular instance where the manager whom he was about to interview said: "Do you want to hear the official story or do you want me to tell you what really happened?" My colleague replied that he of course wanted to know what really happened. The manager then said: "In that case you better turn that tape recorder off."
My colleague was there with a teammate, and reported that the peer pressure was such that he said: "I'm afraid we'll have to leave the tape on and just hear the official story." The taped data were then fed into a larger data pool from which a book was written about this case. I believe these two stories set the proper tone for what I want to say.
In the first part of this paper I would like to make some observations about how we learn in this field and how I believe we should do research. I will argue that we have largely adopted a traditional research paradigm that has not worked very well, a paradigm that has produced very reliable results about very unimportant things, and sometimes possibly invalid results altogether. In that process I believe we have lost touch with some of the important phenomena that go on in organizations, or have ignored them simply because they were too difficult to study by the traditional methods available. All too often we are not willing to turn off the tape recorder. would like to propose that we learn to gather data in natural situations and particularly in "clinical" situations where we are asked in one way or another to help an organization (Schein, 1987a) .
We not only need to learn to gather data in these settings by basic inquiry methods, but we also need to train ourselves to become more helpful and, thereby, get access to organizational situations where clients want something of us. And then, and this is perhaps the most difficult challenge of all, we need to be able to report such data, to learn from them, and to treat them as legitimate scientific data in organizational research. So what I am calling "clinical research" is the observation, elicitation, and reporting of data that are available when we are actively engaged in helping organizations.
We must not confuse clinical research with qualitative research or ethnographic research. What is broadly labelled qualitative or ethnographic or participant observer based research still operates from the traditional scientific model. In this model the investigator at her own initiative requests entry or infiltrates the research site and makes observations without disturbing the situation. In some models of research, the less you influence the research site, the better a researcher you are.
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In the classical Hawthorne studies, you will remember, we made a fetish out of the fact that the observer could be shown to have no effect on the members of the Bank Wiring
Room. Only later did we realize the power of the Hawthorne effect, that actively observing workers and paying attention to them had more impact on their morale and productivity than any of the variables manipulated in the formal study.
The person who understood this best was Kurt Lewin, and I still believe he had it right when he noted that one cannot understand a human system without tryina to chanae it. It is in the attempt to change the system that some of the most important characteristics of the system reveal themselves, phenomena that even the most talented ethnographer would not discover unless he happened to be present when someone else was trying to produce some change.
Clinical research, then, is an extension of the concept of action research as articulated by Lewin and his followers, but it differs from action research in a very important respect. The essence of clinical research is that someone in the organization has requested some form of help and that the researcher comes into the situation in response to the needs of the client, not her own needs to aather data. Some action research fits this model, but there is nothing in the concept of action research per se that focuses on client needs as a necessary condition for relevant data to surface. to develop a site, gain entry, and establish himself as someone who will not be too great a pain to have around. The deal is that the researcher will be allowed to hang around, interview people, maybe even administer questionnaires, provided she does not do too much harm to the organization and provided that whoever approved the entry feels that he is going to get some benefit from seeing the research results.
But notice that there is nothing in the situation that would motivate a member of the organization to put much time or effort into helping the researcher, and there is certainly nothing in the situation that would motivate her to reveal some of her deeper observations or attitudes. 
II. Process Consultation as a Form of Helping
The which means that the client is encouraged to become actively involved in diagnosing his own situation and helping to formulate interventions that will work in his culture (Schein, 1987b (Schein, , 1988 The process of inquiry as conducted by a process consultant is an attempt to meet the client wherever she is and to work with the reality as it is defined. If a formal diagnostic process such as psychological testing or employee surveying is to be done, the decision to do it must be owned fully by the initial client with full knowledge of the Two examples will make this clear. In the use of surveys, the early administration of questionnaires for diagnostic purposes often raises employee expectations that management cannot meet, or creates an illusion of empowerment among employees that does not reflect reality. Because the survey is defined as "merely" diagnostic, insufficient attention is paid to the method by which feedback will be given to participants. If the feedback does not occur or is mishandled, the organizational situation will worsen substantially as a result of the survey administration.
On the use of psychological tests and assessments, I
have recently read a book on psychological consulting to management in which the author outlines as his primary method the following steps. A CEO will call him in with a presenting problem. In order to help, the psychologist will First of all I do not agree to help an organization decipher its culture unless it has some problem it is trying to solve.
To do a full analysis of a culture would require years of ethnographic work and would still leave one wondering whether the description had utility or not. On the other hand, when some senior managers want help in figuring out whether or not their culture aids or hinders their efforts to pursue a new strategy or to make some organizational changes, then we have a basis for moving forward.
I define culture as the sum total of what a given group has learned as a group, and this learning is usually embodied in a set of shared, basic underlying assumptions that are no longer conscious but are taken for granted as the way the world is (Schein, 1985) . The visible, hearable, and feelable artifacts of an organization are a manifestation of those underlying assumptions, as are the articulated and espoused values that often get written down as the company's philosophy.
Given that the essence of the culture is the shared underlying assumptions, the next step is to get the group that wants to solve a problem to come together as a group to learn to decipher its own culture. The composition of the group should depend on the nature of the problem the company is trying to solve, and this will typically be worked out by the process consultant working directly with the client to determine the pros and cons of various alternative groupings.
In one recent case the problem was to identify in a culturally diverse company that had grown up by a series of acquisitions how to identify areas where common policies and practices were needed as the company moved forward into an uncertain future. In effect, the company wanted to know what components of its various sub-cultures should be a common culture. It was agreed that all the senior corporate managers and division general managers had to be present for this analysis.
-In another case, a company was running a senior management development program which focused in part on a new strategy that the company was implementing. In this case they decided simply to insert one full day session on organizational culture to examine how the strategy would be impacted by the culture. I have had as few as five and as many as 100 in a room engaging in this type of activity. The role of the consultant in this process is to stage manage the activity, to provide the theoretical framework within which to discuss culture, to remind the group of the organizational problem it is trying to solve (why we are doing this), and to ask provocative questions to elicit deeper levels of data than the participants might have come up with on their own. As more data are out, the consultant can certainly begin to reveal her own hypotheses about some of the deeper assumptions that may be shared, but she must keep her clinical hat on at all times to insure that whatever confrontive interpretations are made, they will be seen as helpful and will elicit more data. 1) The assumption that people work best when you given them rules to cover all contingencies, so the company had procedure manuals that covered everything; and 2) they also had been living with the assumption that the only way you can keep people focused on the rules is to immediately punish any deviation from the rules. In other words, they had been operating from a theory of human nature 21 that had built a powerful control system which, in turn, guaranteed that no-one would take any risks and innovate.
This insight produced a dilemma that management then had to grapple with. Should one try to change an assumptions that had been operating for decades, realizing that this might itself take a number of years, or could one reframe the problem to actually take advantage of the rule bound culture by, for example, making a new rule that every employee must contribute at least one new idea a week, or mandating that each company practice had to be reviewed each year. Taking advantage of the existing culture is always an easier change strategy than to try to change deeply held cultural assumptions.
In the conglomerate group previously mentioned, small heterogeneous teams were sent off to identify what elements of their cultures should be blended to create a stronger common culture eventually. As they analyzed their assumptions in a historical context, quite a different insight emerged. They realized that they had all developed under strong founders and when they had been acquired it had been the policy to let each division continue to operate in a very autonomous fashion. In most cases these founders had been strong paternalistic father figures but they had all died or retired by the time this meeting was held. In recent years they had begun to miss these strong leaders and longed to recapture a sense of strong central leadership. What they really wanted was strong father figures not a common culture.
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In fact, they realized that a strong common culture would interfere with the autonomous ways of operating that they had all become used to.
They were able to reframe and redefine their problem as So what the clinical process revealed was that the phenomenon was overdetermined, multiply caused, and deeply embedded in a set of cultural assumptions about work, authority, and career development. We were dealing with a complex system of forces, and once this system was understood as a system, it became obvious why the bank did not introduce Some suggestions come to mind. Why dont we send all our graduate students off into organizations to help them with something. Would it be that hard to locate organizations that would take interns for six months to a year not to subject themselves to research but have an intelligent energetic extra hand to work on some immediate problems? The more immediate and practical the problems the better.
Students would learn helping and inquiry skills fairly fast if they knew they would need them during their internship.
Why dont we teach our students basic interviewing and observational skills? Instead of learning how to analyze tests or surveys, students might spend more time analyzing the everyday reality they encounter in a real organization.
Why dont we use more clinical materials in our graduate programs such as the recent books by Hirschhorn (1988 Hirschhorn ( , 1991 , Kets de Vries (1984a; 1984b) , Levinson (1972) and others who try to lay out more systematically some of the dynamic processes they have observed?
Why dont we put much more emphasis on self-insight so that future clinician researchers can get in touch with their biases early in their career as a way of clarifying their vision?
VII. Conclusion
The bottom line to all this, then, is that we need clinical skills for generating relevant data, for obtaining insights into what is really going on, and for helping managers to be more effective. we need more journals and outlets for clinical research, for case studies that are real cases, not demonstration cases to make a teaching point. We need to legitimate clinical research as a valid part of our field and start to train people in helping skills as well as in research skills. And we need more insight into our own cultural assumptions to determine how much they bias our The ultimate challenge for the researcher is to find roles for herself in which she can be helpful, and the ultimate challenge for graduate education in our field is to train our doctoral and masters students in how to be helpful.
Certainly our organizations need help. Isnt it more important to try to help them and learn in the process than to make a sacred cow out of a research paradigm that produces neither valid knowledge nor help. I think I am asking many of you to re-examine your own assumptions and to reframe your own thinking in a major way. Are you brave enough to try it?
